

110TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. _____

To implement the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. SALAZAR (for himself and Mr. ALEXANDER) introduced the following bill;
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on

A BILL

To implement the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Iraq Study Group Rec-
5 ommendations Implementation Act of 2007”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 Congress makes the following findings:

8 (1) On March 15, 2006, the Iraq Study Group
9 was created at the request of a bipartisan group of
10 members of Congress.

1 (2) The United States Institute of Peace was
2 designated as the facilitating organization for the
3 Iraq Study Group with the support of the Center for
4 the Study of the Presidency, the Center for Stra-
5 tegic and International Studies, and the James A.
6 Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice Univer-
7 sity.

8 (3) The Iraq Study Group was composed of a
9 bipartisan group of senior individuals who have had
10 distinguished careers in public service. The Group
11 was co-chaired by former Secretary of State James
12 A. Baker, III and former chairman of the House
13 Foreign Affairs Committee Lee H. Hamilton, and
14 the other members were former Secretary of State
15 Lawrence S. Eagleburger; Vernon E. Jordan, Jr, the
16 Senior Managing Director of Lazard, Freres and
17 Company; former Attorney General Edwin Meese
18 III; former Supreme Court Associate Justice Sandra
19 Day O'Connor; former White House Chief of Staff
20 Leon E. Panetta; former Secretary of Defense Wil-
21 liam J. Perry; United States Senator Charles S.
22 Robb; and United States Senator Alan K. Simpson.

23 (4) On June 15, 2006, President George W.
24 Bush signed into law the Emergency Supplemental
25 Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on

1 Terror, and Hurricane Recovery, 2006 (Public Law
2 109–234), which provided \$1,000,000 to the United
3 States Institute of Peace for activities in support of
4 the Iraq Study Group.

5 (5) The Iraq Study Group consulted nearly 200
6 leading officials and experts, including the senior
7 members of the Government of Iraq, the United
8 States Government, and key coalition partners and
9 received advice from more than 50 distinguished
10 scholars and experts from a variety of fields who
11 conducted working groups in the areas of economy
12 and reconstruction, military and security, political
13 development, and the strategic environment in Iraq
14 and the Middle East.

15 (6) While the Iraq Study Group recommended
16 shifting the primary mission of United States mili-
17 tary forces in Iraq from combat to training, and
18 while the Iraq Study Group described actions and
19 conditions that could allow for a redeployment of
20 troops not necessary for force protection out of Iraq
21 by the first quarter of 2008, the Iraq Study Group
22 did not set a fixed timetable for withdrawal and said
23 it could support a short-term redeployment of
24 United States combat forces, complemented by com-
25 prehensive political, economic, and diplomatic ef-

1 forts, to stabilize Baghdad or to speed up the mis-
2 sion of training and equipping Iraqis if the United
3 States commander in Iraq determines that such
4 steps would be effective.

5 (7) The report of the Iraq Study Group in-
6 cludes a letter from the co-chairs of the Iraq Study
7 Group, James A. Baker, III and Lee H. Hamilton,
8 which states, “Our political leaders must build a bi-
9 partisan approach to bring a responsible conclusion
10 to what is now a lengthy and costly war. Our coun-
11 try deserves a debate that prizes substance over
12 rhetoric, and a policy that is adequately funded and
13 sustainable. The President and Congress must work
14 together. Our leaders must be candid and forthright
15 with the American people in order to win their sup-
16 port.”

17 (8) The Republicans and Democrats who com-
18 prised the Iraq Study Group reached compromise
19 and consensus and unanimously concluded that their
20 recommendations offer a new way forward for the
21 United States in Iraq and the region, and are com-
22 prehensive and need to be implemented in a coordi-
23 nated fashion.

1 **SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF**
2 **IRAQ STUDY GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS.**

3 It is the sense of Congress that the President and
4 Congress should agree that the way forward in Iraq is to
5 implement the comprehensive set of recommendations of
6 the Iraq Study Group, particularly those specifically de-
7 scribed in this Act, and the President should formulate
8 a comprehensive plan to do so.

9 **SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS IN**
10 **IRAQ.**

11 It is the sense of Congress that, consistent with the
12 recommendations of the Iraq Study Group, the United
13 States Government should—

14 (1) establish a “New Diplomatic Offensive” to
15 deal with the problems of Iraq and of the region;

16 (2) support the unity and territorial integrity of
17 Iraq;

18 (3) encourage other countries in the region to
19 stop the destabilizing interventions and actions of
20 Iraq’s neighbors;

21 (4) secure the borders of Iraq, including
22 through the use of joint patrols with neighboring
23 countries;

24 (5) prevent the expansion of the instability and
25 conflict beyond the borders of Iraq;

1 (6) promote economic assistance, commerce,
2 trade, political support, and, if possible, military as-
3 sistance for the Government of Iraq from non-neigh-
4 boring Muslim nations;

5 (7) energize the governments of other countries
6 to support national political reconciliation in Iraq;

7 (8) encourage the governments of other coun-
8 tries to validate the legitimate sovereignty of Iraq by
9 resuming diplomatic relations, where appropriate,
10 and reestablishing embassies in Baghdad;

11 (9) assist the Government of Iraq in estab-
12 lishing active working embassies in key capitals in
13 the region;

14 (10) help the Government of Iraq reach a mu-
15 tually acceptable agreement on the future of Kirkuk;

16 (11) assist the Government of Iraq in achieving
17 certain security, political, and economic milestones,
18 including better performance on issues such as na-
19 tional reconciliation, equitable distribution of oil rev-
20 enues, and the dismantling of militias;

21 (12) encourage the holding of a meeting or con-
22 ference in Baghdad, supported by the United States
23 and the Government of Iraq, of the Organization of
24 the Islamic Conference or the Arab League, both to
25 assist the Government of Iraq in promoting national

1 reconciliation in Iraq and to reestablish their diplo-
2 matic presence in Iraq;

3 (13) seek the creation of the Iraq International
4 Support Group to assist Iraq in ways the Govern-
5 ment of Iraq would desire, attempting to strengthen
6 Iraq's sovereignty;

7 (14) engage directly with the Governments of
8 Iran and Syria in order to obtain their commitment
9 to constructive policies toward Iraq and other re-
10 gional issues;

11 (15) provide additional political, economic, and
12 military support for Afghanistan including resources
13 that might become available as United States com-
14 bat forces are redeployed from Iraq;

15 (16) remain in contact with the Iraqi leader-
16 ship, conveying the clear message that there must be
17 action by the Government of Iraq to make substan-
18 tial progress toward the achievement of the mile-
19 stones described in section 11, and conveying in as
20 much detail as possible the substance of these ex-
21 changes in order to keep the American people, the
22 Iraqi people, and the people of countries in the re-
23 gion well informed of progress in these areas;

24 (17) make clear the willingness of the United
25 States Government to continue training, assistance,

1 and support for Iraq's security forces, and to con-
2 tinue political, military, and economic support for
3 the Government of Iraq until Iraq becomes more ca-
4 pable of governing, defending, and sustaining itself;

5 (18) make clear that, should the Government of
6 Iraq not make substantial progress toward the
7 achievement of the milestones described in section
8 11, the United States shall reduce its political, mili-
9 tary, or economic support for the Government of
10 Iraq;

11 (19) make clear that the United States Govern-
12 ment does not seek to establish permanent military
13 bases in Iraq;

14 (20) restate that the United States Government
15 does not seek to control the oil resources of Iraq;

16 (21) make active efforts to engage all parties in
17 Iraq, with the exception of al Qaeda;

18 (22) encourage dialogue between sectarian com-
19 munities and press religious leaders inside and out-
20 side of Iraq to speak out on behalf of peace and rec-
21 onciliation;

22 (23) support the presence of neutral inter-
23 national experts as advisors to the Government of
24 Iraq on the processes of disarmament, demobiliza-
25 tion, and reintegration of militias and other armed

1 groups not under the control of the Government of
2 Iraq; and

3 (24) ensure that reconstruction efforts in Iraq
4 consist of great involvement by and with inter-
5 national partners that actively participate in the de-
6 sign and construction of projects.

7 **SEC. 5. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON SECURITY AND MILI-**
8 **TARY FORCES.**

9 It shall be the policy of the United States to formu-
10 late and implement with the Government of Iraq a plan,
11 consistent with the recommendations of the Iraq Study
12 Group, that—

13 (1) gives the highest priority to the training,
14 equipping, advising, and support for security and
15 military forces in Iraq and to supporting
16 counterterrorism operations in Iraq; and

17 (2) supports the providing of more and better
18 equipment for the Iraqi Army by encouraging the
19 Government of Iraq to accelerate its requests under
20 the Foreign Military Sales program and, as United
21 States combat brigades redeploy from Iraq, provides
22 for the transfer of certain United States military
23 equipment to Iraqi forces.

1 **SEC. 6. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON STRENGTHENING THE**
2 **UNITED STATES MILITARY.**

3 It shall be the policy of the United States to formu-
4 late and implement a plan, consistent with the rec-
5 ommendations of the Iraq Study Group, that—

6 (1) directs the Secretary of Defense to build
7 healthy relations between the civilian and military
8 sectors, by creating an environment where senior
9 military leaders feel free to offer independent advice
10 to the civilian leadership of the United States Gov-
11 ernment;

12 (2) emphasizes training and education pro-
13 grams for the forces that have returned to the
14 United States in order to restore the United States
15 Armed Forces to a high level of readiness for global
16 contingencies;

17 (3) provides sufficient funds to restore military
18 equipment to full functionality over the next 5 years;
19 and

20 (4) assesses the full future budgetary impact of
21 the war in Iraq and its potential impact on—

22 (A) the future readiness of United States
23 military forces;

24 (B) the ability of the United States Armed
25 Forces to recruit and retain high-quality per-
26 sonnel;

1 (C) needed investments in military pro-
2 curement and in research and development; and
3 (D) the budgets of other Federal agencies
4 involved in the stability and reconstruction ef-
5 fort in Iraq.

6 **SEC. 7. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON POLICE AND CRIMINAL**
7 **JUSTICE IN IRAQ.**

8 It shall be the policy of the United States to formu-
9 late and implement with the Government of Iraq a plan,
10 consistent with the recommendations of the Iraq Study
11 Group, that—

12 (1) transfers the Iraqi National Police to the
13 Ministry of Defense, where the police commando
14 units will become part of the new Iraqi Army;

15 (2) transfers the Iraqi Border Police to the
16 Ministry of Defense, which would have total respon-
17 sibility for border control and external security;

18 (3) establishes greater responsibility for the
19 Iraqi Police Service to conduct criminal investiga-
20 tions and expands its cooperation with other ele-
21 ments in the judicial system in Iraq in order to bet-
22 ter control crime and protect Iraqi civilians;

23 (4) establishes a process of organizational
24 transformation, including efforts to expand the capa-
25 bility and reach of the current major crime unit, to

1 exert more authority over local police forces, and to
2 give sole authority to the Ministry of the Interior to
3 pay police salaries and disburse financial support to
4 local police;

5 (5) proceeds with efforts to identify, register,
6 and control the Facilities Protection Service;

7 (6) directs the Department of Defense to con-
8 tinue its mission to train Iraqi National Police and
9 the Iraqi Border Police, which shall be placed within
10 the Iraqi Ministry of Defense;

11 (7) directs the Department of Justice to pro-
12 ceed with the mission of training the police forces
13 remaining under the Ministry of the Interior;

14 (8) provides for funds from the Government of
15 Iraq to expand and upgrade communications equip-
16 ment and motor vehicles for the Iraqi Police Service;

17 (9) directs the Attorney General to lead the
18 work of organizational transformation in the Min-
19 istry of the Interior and creates a strategic plan and
20 standard administrative procedures, codes of con-
21 duct, and operational measures for Iraqis; and

22 (10) directs the Attorney General to establish
23 courts, train judges, prosecutors, and investigators,
24 and create strongly supported and funded institu-
25 tions and practices in Iraq to fight corruption.

1 **SEC. 8. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON OIL SECTOR IN IRAQ.**

2 It shall be the policy of the United States to formu-
3 late and implement with the Government of Iraq a plan,
4 consistent with the recommendations of the Iraq Study
5 Group, that—

6 (1) provides technical assistance in drafting leg-
7 islation to implement the February 27, 2007, agree-
8 ment by Iraq’s Council of Ministers on principles for
9 the equitable sharing of oil resources and revenues;

10 (2) encourages the Government of Iraq to accel-
11 erate contracting for the comprehensive oil well
12 work-overs in the southern fields needed to increase
13 oil production, while ensuring that the United States
14 no longer funds such infrastructure projects;

15 (3) supports the Iraqi military and private secu-
16 rity forces in their efforts to protect oil infrastruc-
17 ture and contractors;

18 (4) implements metering at both ends of the oil
19 supply line to immediately improve accountability in
20 the oil sector;

21 (5) in conjunction with the International Mone-
22 tary Fund, encourages the Government of Iraq to
23 reduce subsidies in the energy sector;

24 (6) encourages investment in Iraq’s oil sector
25 by the international community and by international
26 energy companies;

1 (7) assists Iraqi leaders to reorganize the na-
2 tional oil industry as a commercial enterprise, in
3 order to enhance efficiency, transparency, and ac-
4 countability;

5 (8) encourages the Government of Iraq to post
6 all oil contracts, volumes, and prices on the Internet
7 so that Iraqis and outside observers can track ex-
8 ports and export revenues;

9 (9) supports the efforts of the World Bank to
10 ensure that best practices are used in contracting;
11 and

12 (10) provides technical assistance to the Min-
13 istry of Oil for enhancing maintenance, improving
14 the payments process, managing cash flows, improv-
15 ing contracting and auditing, and updating profes-
16 sional training programs for management and tech-
17 nical personnel.

18 **SEC. 9. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON IMPROVING ASSIST-**
19 **ANCE PROGRAMS IN IRAQ.**

20 It shall be the policy of the United States to formu-
21 late and implement a plan, consistent with the rec-
22 ommendations of the Iraq Study Group, that—

23 (1) provides for the United States to take the
24 lead in funding assistance requests from the United

1 Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other
2 humanitarian agencies;

3 (2) creates a new Senior Advisor for Economic
4 Reconstruction in Iraq reporting to the President,
5 with the authority to bring interagency unity of ef-
6 fort to the policy, budget, and implementation of
7 economic reconstruction programs in Iraq and the
8 authority to serve as the principal point of contact
9 with United States partners in the overall recon-
10 struction effort;

11 (3) gives the chief of mission in Iraq the au-
12 thority to spend significant funds through a program
13 structured along the lines of the Commander's
14 Emergency Response Program, with the authority to
15 rescind funding from programs and projects—

16 (A) in which the Government of Iraq is not
17 demonstrating effective partnership; or

18 (B) that do not demonstrate substantial
19 progress toward achievement of the milestones
20 described in section 11;

21 (4) authorizes and implements a more flexible
22 security assistance program for Iraq, breaking down
23 the barriers to effective interagency cooperation; and

24 (5) grants authority to merge United States as-
25 sistance with assistance from international donors

1 and Iraqi participants for the purpose of carrying
2 out joint assistance projects.

3 **SEC. 10. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON BUDGET PREPARA-**
4 **TION, PRESENTATION, AND REVIEW.**

5 It shall be the policy of the United States to formu-
6 late and implement a plan, consistent with the rec-
7 ommendations of the Iraq Study Group, that—

8 (1) directs the President to include the costs for
9 the war in Iraq in the annual budget request;

10 (2) directs the Secretary of State, the Secretary
11 of Defense, and the Director of National Intelligence
12 to provide United States military and civilian per-
13 sonnel in Iraq the highest possible priority in obtain-
14 ing professional language proficiency and cultural
15 training;

16 (3) directs the United States Government to
17 provide for long-term training for Federal agencies
18 that participate in complex stability operations like
19 those in Iraq and Afghanistan;

20 (4) creates training for United States Govern-
21 ment personnel to carry out civilian tasks associated
22 with complex stability operations; and

23 (5) directs the Director of National Intelligence
24 and the Secretary of Defense to devote greater ana-
25 lytic resources to understanding the threats and

1 sources of violence in Iraq and institute immediate
2 changes in the collection of data and violence and
3 the sources of violence to provide a more accurate
4 picture of events on the ground in Iraq.

5 **SEC. 11. CONDITIONS FOR CONTINUED UNITED STATES**
6 **SUPPORT IN IRAQ.**

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—It shall be the policy of the United
8 States to condition continued United States political, mili-
9 tary and economic support for Iraq upon the demonstra-
10 tion by the Government of Iraq of sufficient political will
11 and the making of substantial progress toward achieving
12 the milestones described in subsection (b), and to base the
13 decision to transfer command and control over Iraqi secu-
14 rity forces units from the United States to Iraq in part
15 upon such factors.

16 (b) MILESTONES.—The milestones referred to in sub-
17 section (a) are the following:

18 (1) Promptly establishing a fair process for con-
19 sidering amendments to the constitution of Iraq that
20 promote lasting national reconciliation in Iraq.

21 (2) Enacting legislation or establishing other
22 mechanisms to revise the de-Baathification laws in
23 Iraq to encourage the employment in the Govern-
24 ment of Iraq of qualified professionals, irrespective
25 of ethnic or political affiliation, including ex-

1 Baathists who were not leading figures of the Sad-
2 dam Hussein regime.

3 (3) Enacting legislation or establishing other
4 binding mechanisms to ensure the sharing of all
5 Iraqi oil revenues among all segments of Iraqi soci-
6 ety in an equitable manner.

7 (4) Holding free and fair provincial elections in
8 Iraq at the earliest date practicable.

9 (5) Enacting legislation or establishing other
10 mechanisms to ensure the rights of women and the
11 rights of all minority communities in Iraq are pro-
12 tected.

13 **SEC. 12. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON REDEPLOYMENT OF**
14 **UNITED STATES FORCES FROM IRAQ.**

15 It is the sense of Congress that—

16 (1) with the implementation of the policies
17 specified in sections 5 through 11 and the engage-
18 ment in the increased diplomatic efforts specified in
19 section 4, and as additional Iraqi brigades are being
20 deployed, and subject to unexpected developments in
21 the security situation on the ground, all United
22 States combat brigades not necessary for force pro-
23 tection could be redeployed from Iraq by the first
24 quarter of 2008, except for those that are essential
25 for—

- 1 (A) protecting United States and coalition
2 personnel and infrastructure;
3 (B) training, equipping, and advising Iraqi
4 forces;
5 (C) conducting targeted counterterrorism
6 operations;
7 (D) search and rescue; and
8 (E) rapid reaction and special operations;
9 and

10 (2) the redeployment should be implemented as
11 part of a comprehensive diplomatic, political, and
12 economic strategy that includes sustained engage-
13 ment with Iraq's neighbors and the international
14 community for the purpose of working collectively to
15 bring stability to Iraq.

16 **SEC. 13. REPORT ON POLICY IMPLEMENTATION.**

17 Not later than 90 days after the date of the enact-
18 ment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter, the Presi-
19 dent shall submit to Congress a report on the actions that
20 have been taken to implement the policies specified in sec-
21 tions 4 through 11.